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3 
 
           Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises from the bankruptcy and subsequent 
closing of a jet aircraft manufacturer, and requires us to assess 
that manufacturer’s obligation under the Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2101-2109, to give fair warning to its employees before 
effecting a mass layoff.  On appeal, we are asked to determine 
whether a business must notify its employees of a pending 
layoff once the layoff becomes probable—that is, more likely 
than not—or if the mere foreseeable possibility that a layoff 
may occur is enough to trigger the WARN Act’s notice 
requirements.  Because we conclude that a probability of 
layoffs is necessary, and the manufacturer has demonstrated 
that its closing was not probable until the day that it occurred, 
it cannot be held liable for its failure to give its employees 
requisite notice.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court, which in turn affirmed the judgment of the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
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I. Background 
 Appellants are former employees of Appellee Eclipse 
Aviation Corporation1 who were laid off when Eclipse 
unexpectedly closed its doors in February 2009.  This 
shutdown was not expected because when Eclipse declared 
bankruptcy in November 2008, it reached an agreement to 
sell the company to its largest shareholder, European 
Technology and Investment Research Center, (ETIRC)2—an 
agreement that, if it had closed, would have allowed Eclipse 
to continue its operations.  The sale, however, required 
significant funding from Vnesheconomban (VEB), a state-
owned Russian Bank, and this funding never materialized.  
For a month, Eclipse waited for the deal to go through with 
almost daily assurances that the funding was imminent and 
the company could be saved, but eventually, as those 
assurances failed to bear fruit, the time came when it was 
forced to cease operations altogether.  To explain why layoffs 
were not probable before that point, however, we must review 
the development of the relationship between Eclipse and 
ETIRC, and their prospective financing arrangement with 
VEB.   
                                                 
1 Eclipse’s interests in this litigation are represented by 
Jeoffrey L. Burtch—the Trustee responsible for administering 
Eclipse’s estate.  For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to 
Appellee solely as “Eclipse.”   
 
 2 ETIRC formed a separate subsidiary entity, 
EclipseJet Aviation International, Inc., for purposes of this 
acquisition.  For ease of explanation and to accord with the 
nomenclature used by the parties, we will refer to ETIRC and 
all of its subsidiaries simply as “ETIRC.”  
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 The relationship between Eclipse and ETIRC began in 
2004 when ETIRC became both a customer for and 
distributor of Eclipse’s aircrafts.  After three years as a 
customer and distributor, ETIRC became an investor in 
Eclipse in late 2007, providing Eclipse with a significant loan 
in exchange for preferred stock.  Around the same time, 
Eclipse and ETIRC also agreed to a Memorandum of 
Understanding under which ETIRC was to buy aircraft kits 
from Eclipse to be assembled by a factory in Russia 
(“Russian factory deal”).  This arrangement was to be 
financed in large part by VEB, and money generated from 
this project was expected to play a large role in ensuring that 
Eclipse could maintain its working capital requirements for 
the upcoming year.  Shortly thereafter, in early 2008, ETIRC 
purchased additional preferred stock in Eclipse and, as part of 
a restructuring agreement, Eclipse agreed to appoint two 
representatives of ETIRC to its five-member board of 
directors.  Following these investments, ETIRC continued to 
provide Eclipse with financial support as needed.   
 In June 2008, the closing of the Russian factory deal 
became delayed and Eclipse began to run out of money.  As 
Eclipse’s financial troubles mounted, its dependency on 
ETIRC grew and, after Eclipse breached its minimum cash 
covenant required to operate, ETIRC provided Eclipse with a 
$25 million unsecured loan to help keep the company solvent.  
Shortly thereafter, ETIRC’s Chairman, Roel Pieper, was 
named acting Chief Executive Officer of Eclipse.   
  Despite ETIRC’s support, Eclipse’s solvency was 
short-lived.  Although the Russian factory deal continued to 
progress and Pieper reported to Eclipse’s board of directors 
that the issues that had caused its delay had been resolved, the 
timing of the closing remained uncertain, and, by November 
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2008, Eclipse had again fallen below its minimum cash 
covenant.  At that point, an ad hoc committee of Eclipse’s 
noteholders froze all company accounts, and Eclipse’s board 
of directors began to explore the company’s options via 
bankruptcy proceedings.   
 The board of directors considered pursuing three 
possible courses of action in bankruptcy: (1) auctioning off 
Eclipse’s assets as a whole pursuant to Section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), with ETIRC serving 
as a “stalking horse” bidder; 3 (2) auctioning off the 
company’s assets as a whole in a “naked” sale pursuant to 
Section 363—that is, conducting an auction without a 
“stalking horse” bidder, J.A. 960; and (3) liquidating the 
company pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
ETIRC expressed a “genuine interest” in continuing Eclipse’s 
business, J.A. 960, and committed an additional $1.6 million 
                                                 
3 A “stalking horse” bidder enters into an asset 
purchase agreement with the debtor (in this case, Eclipse) 
prior to an auction.  The price agreed upon in the asset 
purchase agreement must then withstand the auction, 
conducted in accordance with bidding procedures approved 
by the bankruptcy court.  Thus, “[t]he purpose of a stalking 
horse in the context of a § 363 sale is to establish a 
competitive floor or minimum bid amount for the purchase of 
the debtor’s business, thereby preventing lowball offers that 
would fail to provide a minimum amount of value.”  Rakhee 
V. Patel & Vickie L. Driver, Toto, I’ve A Feeling We’re Not 
in Kansas Anymore: Bankruptcy Sales Outside the Ordinary 
Course of Business, Fed. Law., February 2010, at 56, 58. 
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to help fund Eclipse’s operations while the two sides 
negotiated an agreement for ETIRC to acquire Eclipse.   
 On November 25, 2008, Eclipse filed a petition for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code along 
with an asset purchase agreement to sell substantially all of 
the company’s assets to ETIRC pending an auction.  The deal 
included a provision that VEB would provide ETIRC with a 
$205 million loan, and, although the asset purchase 
agreement did not contain any express provisions requiring 
ETIRC to take on Eclipse’s employees, it specifically 
provided that Eclipse was to continue operating its business 
and retain its employees through closing.  The Bankruptcy 
Court entered an order approving the proposed procedures 
governing the auction and sale, and an auction and sale 
hearing were scheduled for mid-January 2009.   
 Eclipse did not receive any additional qualifying bids 
for the company, and, after a multiple-day sale hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an order on January 23, 2009, 
approving a second amended asset purchase agreement under 
which Eclipse was to be sold to ETIRC.  Although ETIRC’s 
receiving additional financing was not a condition of the 
sale’s closing, the amended agreement stated that VEB had 
delivered a fully executed commitment letter confirming that 
it would provide ETIRC with a $205 million loan to finance 
the sale.  Like the original agreement, the amended agreement 
did not require ETIRC to retain Eclipse’s employees, but did 
provide that Eclipse was to continue its full operations 
through closing.  Lastly, although the agreement did not 
contain a specific closing date, it afforded both parties the 
option to terminate the agreement if closing did not occur by 
February 28, 2009.   
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 In the month that followed, VEB took ETIRC and 
Eclipse on a roller coaster ride of promises and assurances 
that never came to fruition.  Following the Bankruptcy 
Court’s approval of the agreement, closing was originally 
scheduled for January 29th, but it did not move forward on 
that date because VEB was unexpectedly insolvent.  
Nonetheless, Pieper reported to Eclipse’s board that he had 
been assured that then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
personally would make a decision on February 2nd as to 
whether the sale could still be funded.  On February 3rd, 
Pieper and Daniel Bolotin, another ETIRC executive who sat 
on Eclipse’s board of directors, reported to the board that 
VEB would be recapitalized on February 5th, that there was a 
“high likelihood” the sale’s funding would be approved by 
the Russian parliament that same day, and that the funding 
would become available early the following week.  J.A. 1001.  
Eclipse’s disinterested directors,4 however, were not 
comfortable with this uncertain arrangement and agreed that 
while they had “no reason to disbelieve” Pieper and Bolotin’s 
reports, they would “need to see specific documentation . . . 
evidencing the approval of . . . the recapitalization of VEB . . . 
[and] the approval of the [funding for the sale],” and, without 
such documentation, they would recommend that the sale be 
called off and Eclipse’s bankruptcy proceedings be converted 
                                                 
 4 Although Pieper and other ETIRC executives were 
members of Eclipse’s board, all decision-making regarding 
the sale to ETIRC was delegated to Eclipse’s two 
disinterested directors, Kent Kresa, who previously served as 
chairman of General Motors Co. and chairman and CEO of 
Northrup Grumman Corp., and Harold Poling, the former 
chairman and CEO of Ford Motor Co.   
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to a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
J.A. 1003-04.  
Consistent with Pieper’s report, on February 5th, the 
Russian parliament approved the recapitalization of VEB and 
ETIRC’s funding, and Pieper was invited to Moscow the 
following week to sign documents finalizing the agreement.  
With the closing seeming imminent, ETIRC also agreed to 
provide additional funding of its own to cover the added costs 
Eclipse had incurred as a result of this delay.   
 Pieper arrived in Moscow on February 10th, and 
informed Eclipse executives and the board the next day that 
while, much to his surprise, VEB had not yet been 
recapitalized, the final necessary meeting would take place 
later that week and VEB would receive funds on either 
February 13th or February 16th, with the ETIRC funds 
becoming available shortly thereafter.  Bolotin described 
Pieper’s meeting with Prime Minister Putin’s deputy as 
“positive,” and Pieper indicated that “all of the background 
work in Russia has been successfully completed and all that 
remains is execution and timing.”  J.A. 1012-13.   
At that same board meeting, Eclipse’s CFO reported 
that the company had become administratively insolvent as of 
February 6th and was on pace to run out of money the week 
of February 20th.  In light of Eclipse’s dwindling finances, its 
disinterested directors resolved that if ETIRC had not 
received the funding or “satisfactory confirmation” of it by 
February 16th, they would recommend either a Chapter 7 
liquidation or that all but a handful of Eclipse employees be 
furloughed to preserve the company’s money while it waited 
for the VEB financing to arrive.  J.A. 1015.  
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 On February 16th, a Russian Governor appeared by 
phone at a meeting of Eclipse’s full board of directors and 
informed them that VEB had been recapitalized, that funding 
the Eclipse project was one of Prime Minister Putin’s top 
priorities, and that the Governor expected to have more 
information on the structure of the financing the following 
day.  The board minutes also reflect that the Governor 
“expressed his optimism that the funding could occur 
rapidly.”  J.A. 1017.  This was enough to assure Eclipse’s 
disinterested directors that a conversion to liquidation was 
unnecessary at that time, but they agreed to move forward 
with the furlough if the funding did not arrive the following 
day.  As an alternative possibility, the disinterested directors 
inquired of Pieper whether ETIRC could, at least in the short 
term, fund the agreement without the loan from VEB.   
 On February 17th, Pieper and Bolotin reported to the 
board that VEB had allocated a budget to fund the sale and 
there was a possibility that funding would arrive as early as 
the next day.  Pieper also disclosed that, in the event the 
funding was further delayed, ETIRC did not have the capital 
to fund Eclipse on its own.  At a meeting of the disinterested 
directors that same day, Eclipse’s CFO informed the 
disinterested directors that, without further funding, the 
company was set to run out of money by February 27th.  In 
light of this information, the disinterested directors agreed to 
proceed with the furlough to ensure that the company could 
continue through the anticipated closure.  Accordingly, on 
February 18th, Eclipse employees were informed that “the 
sale of Eclipse Aviation is taking longer than expected” and 
that, although “all actions to date allow us to believe that the 
sale and closing of the overall process is well within reach,” 
they were being furloughed indefinitely in order to “make the 
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company’s remaining cash last as long as possible and give 
[Eclipse] the most time to complete the sale.”  J.A. 1025.     
On February 19th, Pieper reported to Eclipse’s CFO 
that VEB had approved all documentation, that the money 
had been allocated, and all that was needed was the final 
signoff from Prime Minister Putin.  The next day, the ad hoc 
committee of noteholders informed Pieper that, due to 
ETIRC’s failure to obtain financing, they had “no alternative” 
but to convert Eclipse’s bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 
liquidation.  J.A. 691.  Pieper informed the noteholders that 
there would be further meetings in Russia the following day, 
and that he would have more information then.   
At the board meeting on February 21st, Pieper 
similarly reported he expected the funding to be approved 
later that afternoon, and Bolotin confirmed that a meeting was 
occurring that afternoon at the Moscow “White House” and a 
final decision would be made at that time.  J.A. 1027-28.  
When the board reconvened later that day, however, Bolotin 
gave the board the bad news that, contrary to all prior 
representations, Prime Minister Putin had not made a decision 
on the funding, because he “still had to think about it.”  J.A. 
1028.  Bolotin also reported that the Russian Governor who 
had assured the board a few days earlier that the funding was 
coming could not attend the meeting with Prime Minister 
Putin due to a medical emergency, and that Bolotin would be 
receiving a more detailed description the following day of 
what had occurred during the meeting with the Prime 
Minister.   
According to the noteholders’ motion to convert, 
Pieper did not show up for a scheduled meeting that day and, 
on February 22nd, informed the committee that problems 
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appeared to have arisen with the financing in Russia.  When 
no further updates of progress from Pieper or Bolotin had 
been received by February 23rd, the noteholders informed the 
board and Pieper that they were ready to pull the plug on the 
deal and to file a motion to convert Eclipse’s bankruptcy to 
liquidation proceedings.  Pieper asked for one more day to 
make the financing come through, and Bolotin advised the 
board that ETIRC’s Moscow attorney would personally call 
Prime Minister Putin the following morning to advocate for 
the project, expressing confidence that he could provide a 
final answer to the board the next day.  The noteholders and 
disinterested directors agreed to wait one more day for a 
definitive answer, but adopted a resolution directing 
management to file a motion to convert the bankruptcy to 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings at 2:00 p.m. on February 
24th unless they received a “formal written commitment from 
the Russian Government” that committed to closing by 
February 26th—the day before Eclipse expected to run out of 
money.  J.A. 1029-30.  No commitment came that afternoon, 
and the motion to convert was then filed on February 24th.  
 Once the motion was filed, Eclipse emailed its 
employees informing them that despite its best efforts, 
“closing of the sale transaction has stalled and our company is 
out of time and money,” and that because of the “dire 
circumstances in today’s global marketplace” and the lack of 
any additional funding, the company’s noteholders and board 
of directors had decided to convert Eclipse’s bankruptcy from 
a reorganization under Chapter 11 to a liquidation under 
Chapter 7.  J.A. 1039.  The email explained that this meant 
the prior furlough had been converted into a layoff, effective 
February 19th, and that the employees would receive 
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information regarding their benefits packages in the mail later 
that week.  
 Eclipse’s employees filed the class action complaint 
that gave rise to this appeal—an adversary proceeding in the 
Bankruptcy Court alleging that Eclipse’s failure to give them 
sixty days’ notice prior to the layoff violated the WARN Act.  
After discovery, the employees moved for partial summary 
judgment, asserting that Eclipse could invoke neither the 
Act’s “faltering company” exception, nor its “unforeseeable 
business circumstances” exception to excuse its lack of 
notice, and Eclipse filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, contending that the “unforeseeable business 
circumstances” exception barred WARN Act liability.  The 
Bankruptcy Court agreed with Eclipse and granted summary 
judgment in its favor.  In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 522 B.R. 62 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2014).  The District Court affirmed on appeal, 
In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 556 B.R. 609 (D. Del. 2016), and 
this appeal followed.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b), the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d).  In reviewing bankruptcy court decisions on appeal, 
we “stand in the shoes” of the district court and apply the 
same standard of review.  In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 
645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  Here, we 
exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Eclipse.  See id. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s and, in turn, the 
Bankruptcy Court’s grant of summary judgment only if we 
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conclude “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We must view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party 
“the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”  Reliance Ins. Co. 
v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997).  We do not 
weigh the evidence; rather, we assess whether the evidence is 
“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986).  Thus, in this case, summary judgment is 
only appropriate if no reasonable jury could find Eclipse 
liable under the WARN Act.  
III. Analysis  
  The WARN Act was enacted in response to significant 
worker dislocation that occurred throughout the 1970s and 
1980s when “[a]s companies were merged, acquired, or 
closed, many employees lost their jobs, often without notice. . 
. . [And] [i]n some circumstances, the projected closing was 
concealed from the employees.”  Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. 
Int’l Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Assocs., 173 F.3d 175, 
182 (3d Cir. 1999).  To ensure that laid-off workers and their 
families receive “some transition time to adjust to the 
prospective loss of employment,” 20 C.F.R. § 639.1, the Act 
requires employers to give sixty days’ notice to all affected 
employees or their representatives prior to a mass layoff or a 
plant closing.  29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).  While it is undisputed 
that Eclipse did not comply with this notice requirement, the 
Act contains multiple exceptions, and Eclipse asserts that one 
of them—the “unforeseeable business circumstances” 
exception—bars liability in this case.  
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That exception must be offered by the employer as an 
affirmative defense and applies when “the closing or mass 
layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not 
reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would have 
been required.”  Id. § 2102(b)(2)(A).  Specifically, the 
employer must demonstrate (1) that the business 
circumstances that caused the layoff were not reasonably 
foreseeable and (2) that those circumstances were the cause of 
the layoff.  Calloway v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 800 F.3d 
244, 251 (6th Cir. 2015); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b).  Even if an 
employer establishes that unforeseeable events prevented it 
from giving notice sixty days in advance, the Act still requires 
that employers “give as much notice as is practicable” under 
the circumstances, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3), including, where 
appropriate, “notice after the fact,” 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.   
Appellants contend that Eclipse has not met its burden 
of demonstrating that the unforeseeable business 
circumstances exception applies for three reasons.  First, they 
argue, as a threshold matter, that Eclipse is ineligible for the 
exception because, even after the fact, it never provided its 
employees with proper notice of their termination.  Second, 
they contend that Eclipse cannot show that the purported 
unforeseeable business circumstance—its failure to close its 
proposed sale to ETIRC—was, in fact, the cause of the mass 
layoff.  Third, they assert that, even if the failure to close the 
sale was the cause of the layoff, the exception still would not 
apply because the failure to close was not “unforeseeable” but 
rather could have been anticipated at many points in the sixty-
day window prior to the layoff.  We address these contentions 
in order.  
A.  Sufficiency of Notice of Termination 
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 We turn first to Appellants’ contention that Eclipse 
cannot qualify for the unforeseeable business circumstances 
exception to excuse its untimely notice of termination 
because, even when Eclipse did eventually inform its 
employees that they were being laid off, the contents of that 
notice and Eclipse’s method of delivery were statutorily 
deficient under the WARN Act.  See Sides v. Macon Cty. 
Greyhound Park, Inc., 725 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“[I]t is manifest that a WARN Act employer attempting to 
circumvent the 60–day notice requirement must still give 
some notice in accord with [the other requirements of the 
Act].”).  Taking the requirements of the statute and the 
Department of Labor’s implementing regulations together, 
any notice of a mass layoff must contain “(1) [t]he name and 
address of the employment site where the . . . mass layoff will 
occur, and the name and telephone number of a company 
official to contact for further information; (2) [a] statement as 
to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or 
temporary . . .; (3) [t]he expected date of the first separation 
and the anticipated schedule for making separations; (4) [t]he 
job titles of positions to be affected and the names of the 
workers currently holding affected jobs,” 20 C.F.R. § 
639.7(c); and (5) when given less than sixty days in advance, 
“a brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification 
period,” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3).5  This notice must be “based 
                                                 
 5 At least one district court has held that explicit 
reference to the WARN Act is required in order for notice to 
be proper under the statute.  See Weekes-Walker v. Macon 
Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (M.D. 
Ala. 2012) (“Although by itself not sufficient, a reference to 
the statute, however, is essential to proper notice because it 
provides the affected employees with the framework for 
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on the best information available to the employer at the time 
the notice is served,” 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(a)(4), and delivered 
in a manner “which is designed to ensure receipt,” id. § 639.8.   
Here, all of these requirements are met.  After learning 
that Eclipse’s bankruptcy proceedings would be converted to 
a Chapter 7 liquidation on February 24, 2009, Eclipse’s 
management sent the following message, in pertinent part, to 
all employees’ work email addresses:  
We are very sad to report 
unexpected news today.  Despite 
the efforts of many people at 
EclipseJet Aviation and ETIRC to 
obtain necessary funding to close 
the purchase of the assets of 
                                                                                                             
evaluating the validity of the defense.  One cannot assess the 
propriety of a legal defense without first having knowledge of 
the existence of the law.”); cf. Sides, 725 F.3d at 1285 
(affirming the District Court’s ruling in Weekes-Walker on 
other grounds, but observing that, even had the employer 
given timely notice, “[t]he alleged notice provided by [the 
employer] did not reference the WARN Act”).  Here, 
Appellants have waived any argument Eclipse’s notice was 
deficient because it failed to make such an explicit reference 
by failing to raise it before the Bankruptcy Court, the District 
Court, or this Court.  See Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 
225 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, although it may be a good 
practice for employers to make such a reference, we offer no 
opinion as to whether it is statutorily required.  
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Eclipse Aviation, the closing of 
the sale transaction has stalled and 
our company is out of time and 
money.  Given the dire 
circumstances in today’s global 
marketplace and the lack of 
additional debtor-in-possession 
funding, the senior secured 
creditors of the Company filed a 
motion today in US Bankruptcy 
Court in Delaware to convert the 
Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 
liquidation.  This action, under the 
circumstances, is being supported 
by the directors of Eclipse. 
 
What does this mean for each 
employee?  The furlough 
converted to a layoff effective 
Thursday, February 19, 
2009. . . .You may have certain 
rights to seek payment in the 
bankruptcy proceeding; you may 
receive additional information 
about that from the bankruptcy 
court.  
 
. . . Later this week you will 
receive a termination package in 
the mail which will have 
information regarding your 
benefits. 
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J.A. 1039.  The following day, Eclipse mailed those same 
employees termination documents containing information 
about their benefits and the phone number of the vice 
president of human resources who could be contacted for 
further questions.   
 
 We perceive no deficiency in Eclipse’s notice.  The 
February 24th email was clear that the layoff (1) applied to all 
sites company-wide; (2) was permanent; (3) was effective 
retroactively to the date of the furlough; (4) was applicable to 
all employees; and (5) provided specific facts explaining both 
the reasons for the termination and the delay in the provision 
of notice—namely, the buyer’s unexpected failure to obtain 
funding before Eclipse’s debtor-in-possession reserves were 
depleted, the dire financial conditions in the global 
marketplace, the unavailability of additional funds, and the 
noteholders’ resulting decision to convert Eclipse’s case to a 
Chapter 7 liquidation.6  Despite Appellants’ contentions to the 
                                                 
 6  Although the email did not specifically provide the 
contact information for a company representative, the benefits 
letter, dated February 25, 2009, did, and Eclipse may claim 
the benefit of multiple communications combined for 
purposes of WARN Act notice.  Kalwaytis v. Preferred Meal 
Sys., Inc., 78 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1996).  While we have 
held that the effective date of a multi-part notice is the date of 
the final communication when the initial communication was 
ambiguous on such a fundamental issue as whether the layoff 
was temporary or permanent, id., we have not had occasion to 
address whether an initial communication would likewise be 
insufficient to stop the clock where that communication omits 
the contact information for a company representative but 
indicates more information is forthcoming, and that contact 
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contrary, this information was sufficient to “assist” the 
employees in “understand[ing] the employer’s situation and 
its reasons for shortening the notice period.”  Alarcon v. 
Keller Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 Lastly, the email informing employees of the layoff 
was delivered in a manner designed to ensure receipt.  
Although Appellants contend that the email was sent to the 
“wrong addresses” because Appellants had already been 
furloughed and no longer had access to their work email 
accounts, Appellants’ Br. 58, the record reflects both that 
Appellants had access to their work email accounts during the 
furlough, and that, when the furlough first began, members of 
management were told to instruct the employees in their 
respective departments to continue to monitor their work 
email accounts for further updates.  Accordingly, we perceive 
no dispute of material fact as to whether the notice’s contents 
or method of delivery violated the WARN Act, and we turn 
next to the question of whether Eclipse may excuse its failure 
to provide notice at an earlier date by relying on the 
unforeseeable business circumstances defense—that is, 
whether ETIRC’s failure to obtain the financing necessary to 
finalize the sale was the cause of the mass layoff, see infra 
Part B, and, if so, whether that failure was reasonably 
foreseeable prior to February 24, 2009, see infra Part C.  
B.  Causation  
                                                                                                             
information is promptly provided the following day.  We 
need not do so here, as Appellants do not challenge the date 
of the notice on this ground, and any such argument is 
therefore waived.  See Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 225.  
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 For the unforeseeable business circumstances 
exception to apply, Eclipse must demonstrate that the 
allegedly unforeseeable event was, in fact, the cause of the 
layoff.  Calloway, 800 F.3d at 251; 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b).  For 
the reasons set forth below, we agree with the District and 
Bankruptcy Courts that Eclipse has made this showing. 
 The WARN Act provides that “[i]n the case of a sale 
of part or all of an employer’s business,” the seller is 
responsible for providing employees notice of any mass 
layoff “up to and including the effective date of the sale,” at 
which point that responsibility shifts to the buyer.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2101(b)(1).  When a sale proceeds on a “going concern”7 
basis, it is presumed that the sale “involves the hiring of the 
seller’s employees unless something indicates otherwise,” 
regardless of whether the seller has expressly contracted for 
the retention of its employees.  Wilson v. Airtherm Prods., 
Inc., 436 F.3d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Int’l All. of 
Theatrical & Stage Emps. v. Compact Video Servs., Inc., 50 
F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 Relying on this presumption, Eclipse urges that 
because ETIRC had agreed to purchase Eclipse as a going 
concern and nothing indicates otherwise, the District Court 
was correct to find that the employees would have been 
retained (i.e., the layoff would not have occurred but for 
                                                 
 7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “going concern” as 
“[a] commercial enterprise actively engaging in business with 
the expectation of indefinite continuance.”  Going Concern, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Day v. 
Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 828 (8th Cir. 
2016) (adopting same definition).  
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ETIRC’s failure to obtain the financing necessary to finalize 
the sale).  In particular, Eclipse points out that Section 6.7 of 
the second amended asset purchase agreement, entitled 
“Conduct of Business Prior to the Closing Date,” expressly 
required Eclipse to “use commercially reasonable efforts 
to . . . continue operating the Business as a going concern,” to 
“maintain the business organization of the Business intact, 
including its agents, employees, consultants and independent 
contractors,” and to “preserve the goodwill of the 
manufacturers, suppliers, contractors, licensors, employees, 
customers, distributors and others having business relations 
with the Business,” while prohibiting Eclipse from “offer[ing] 
employment for any period on or after the Closing Date to 
any employee or agent of the Business unless [ETIRC] has 
determined not to make an offer of employment” or 
“otherwise attempt[ing] to persuade any such employee or 
agent to terminate his or her relationship with the Business.”  
J.A. 551-52.  These terms, which expressly contemplate a 
going concern transaction and prevent Eclipse from 
disturbing any aspect of its operations or employment 
relationships strongly indicate that, had the sale been 
consummated, ETIRC intended to continue Eclipse’s 
operations largely as is.  
 In addition, circumstantial evidence from the 
discussions leading up to Eclipse’s bankruptcy and the 
subsequent formation of the asset purchase agreement support 
the same conclusion.  The minutes of Eclipse’s board 
meetings prior to its declaration of bankruptcy reflect that part 
of the reason it chose to pursue an auction of the company 
with ETIRC as a stalking horse bidder rather than a “naked” 
auction with no such bidder was to avoid “deep cuts in the 
Company’s operations,” J.A. 956, as the “naked” auction 
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would have required Eclipse to lay off 75% of its employees, 
J.A. 958.  Moreover, when discussing the “employment base 
of [Eclipse]” as part of the sale, ETIRC “indicated [its] 
preference that the Company remain at its current 
employment size,” J.A. 964, and, at the sale hearing before 
the Bankruptcy Court, Eclipse’s counsel represented that the 
sale “would maintain the going concern” of the company and 
“preserve[] employment for hundreds of employees,” J.A. 
673.  ETIRC’s counsel likewise stated at the sale hearing that 
there was a significant benefit to this “going concern” sale as 
it would “continue to provide jobs and the ability for 
customers who already purchased planes to service them.”  
J.A. 674.  Lastly, as the Bankruptcy Court observed, ETIRC 
had set aside a sizable operating budget for the post-sale 
entity, and two high-ranking Eclipse executives testified that 
they believed—albeit based on their subjective impressions—
that ETIRC did not intend to lay off Eclipse’s workforce.  
 For their part, Appellants do not dispute that Eclipse 
was to be sold on a going concern basis and that such sales 
are presumed to transfer all employees, but argue that there is 
something that indicates otherwise: two express provisions of 
the asset purchase agreement, that, in their view, rebut any 
presumption because “there is no evidence that a single 
employee would have been spared termination” had the sale 
been finalized.8  Appellants’ Br. 32.   Specifically, Section 7.2 
                                                 
 8 Appellants also assert that the failure to finalize the 
sale could not have caused the layoff as a matter of simple 
“cause-and-effect logic” because the layoff was made 
retroactive to February 19th, and the sale did not fall apart 
until February 24th.  Appellants’ Br. 26.  This argument is 
easily rejected.  Eclipse’s final decision to lay off its 
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of the agreement provides, “[u]nder no circumstances shall 
[ETIRC] assume or be obligated to pay . . . any claims of or 
liabilities of [Eclipse’s] Employees, including but not limited 
to, any claims or liabilities related to . . .  liability under the 
WARN Act, salaries, vacations, . . . [and] severance pay . . . , 
which Employee Claims shall be and remain the liability, 
responsibility and obligation of the Sellers.”  J.A. 556.  And 
Section 7.3 entitled “Employment,” provides: 
[ETIRC] may (but shall not be 
required to), in its sole and 
absolute discretion, offer 
employment to any and all 
individuals employed by [Eclipse] 
in connection with the Business as 
of the Closing Date . . . .  
[ETIRC’s] employment of any 
individuals previously employed 
by [Eclipse] shall be on an “at 
will” basis and on such other 
terms and conditions of 
employment as [ETIRC] shall 
offer in its sole discretion.  Except 
as otherwise agreed to in writing, 
[ETIRC] shall be under no 
obligation to employ or continue 
                                                                                                             
employees post-dated the noteholders’ February 24th motion 
to convert Eclipse’s bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 liquidation—
the motion which, for all intents and purposes, marked the 
failure of the sale.  Eclipse’s decision to make this February 
24th layoff retroactive to an earlier date has no bearing on our 
causation analysis.  
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to employ any individual for any 
period.  The employees who 
accept [ETIRC’s] offer of 
employment and who commence 
employment with [ETIRC] from 
and after the Closing Date shall be 
referred to herein as the “Hired 
Employees.” Under no 
circumstance shall any individual 
employed or formerly employed 
by [Eclipse] become an employee 
of [ETIRC] unless such individual 
becomes a Hired Employee.  
 
J.A. 556.  Appellants assert that these provisions reflect that 
ETIRC “renounced any intent or obligation to hire [Eclipse’s] 
employees en masse at the closing.”  Appellants’ Br. 27. 
 We conclude Eclipse has the better of the argument.  
Although these terms freed ETIRC from any binding 
obligation to retain Eclipse’s employees and prevented it 
from incurring liabilities were it not to retain them, we agree 
with the District and Bankruptcy Courts that these terms are 
mere “boilerplate language address[ing] a buyer’s typical 
litigation concerns over successor liability and third-party 
beneficiary claims.”  In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 556 B.R. at 
623; see In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 522 B.R. at 69 
(Bankruptcy Court observing that “such terms are boilerplate 
in going-concern sales and merely allow the buyer to pick 
which employees to retain”).  While such boilerplate 
language perhaps signifies that the sustained employment of 
Eclipse’s workforce was not a foregone conclusion, it does 
not rebut the presumption in favor of continued employment 
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in a going concern sale—especially in light of the significant 
evidence that ETIRC intended to carry on Eclipse’s 
operations had the sale been finalized.9   
  In sum, the record supports—and at the very least 
does not rebut—the presumption that Eclipse’s employees 
would have retained their jobs had the sale been finalized, and 
the District Court thus did not err in concluding as a matter of 
law that the failure to obtain financing for that sale was the 
cause of the layoff.  
C.  Foreseeability  
 We turn next to whether the failure of the sale was 
reasonably foreseeable before February 24, 2009—the date 
Eclipse notified its employees of the layoff.  The 
implementing regulations provide that an “unforeseeable 
business circumstance” is one that was “not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time that 60–day notice would have been 
required,” 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b), but they do not define what 
makes a business circumstance “not reasonably foreseeable.”  
                                                 
 9 In support of their argument that the sale’s failure did 
not cause the layoff, Appellants also cite to Pieper’s 
testimony at the sale hearing that he had not made any 
promises of employment to any Eclipse employee and had 
made “[z]ero” decisions as to what Eclipse employment 
contracts ETIRC would assume if the deal were approved.  
J.A. 662-63.  When considered alongside the other evidence 
in the record, Pieper’s testimony, which, in context simply 
preserved ETIRC’s ability to choose at a later date the 
specific employees it would retain, also does not rebut the 
presumption of continued employment resulting from the 
going concern sale. 
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Instead, the regulations counsel that courts are to undertake a 
fact-specific inquiry to assess on a case-by-case basis 
whether, in failing to anticipate the circumstances that caused 
the closing, the employer “exercise[d] such commercially 
reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated 
employer in predicting the demands of its particular market.”  
Id. § 639.9(b)(2); see also Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 98 F.3d 1056, 1060 (8th Cir. 1996).  Likewise, under 
our case law, we consider “the facts and circumstances that 
led to the closing in light of the history of the business and of 
the industry in which that business operated.”  Elsinore, 173 
F.3d at 186. 
 Seeking additional guidance on how to assess such 
facts and circumstances, the District and Bankruptcy Courts 
have invoked the test adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Halkias 
v. General Dynamics Corp., 137 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 
1998), requiring that in order to be “reasonably foreseeable” 
an event must be “probable.”  In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 556 
B.R. at 619; In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 522 B.R. at 69.  
Eclipse urges that this is the correct standard, and that we join 
the four Courts of Appeals, in addition to the Fifth Circuit, 
that have adopted it.  See United Steel Workers of Am. Local 
2660 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 683 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2012); 
Gross v. Hale-Halsell Co., 554 F.3d 870, 876 (10th Cir. 
2009); Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 589 
(7th Cir. 2005); Watson v. Mich. Indus. Holdings, Inc., 311 
F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2002).  Appellants, on the other hand, 
contend the Act does not set so high a threshold for notice 
and that reasonably possible outcomes, although perhaps not 
more likely than other outcomes, should be deemed 
sufficiently foreseeable to trigger the notice requirement.  At 
the very least, Appellants urge that where two outcomes are 
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equally possible—in a game of roulette, for example, where 
the ball will land on either black or red—both must be 
considered “reasonably foreseeable” even though neither 
crosses the more-likely-than-not threshold.  Appellants’ Br. 
38. 
 Below, we will first address what standard should be 
applied when assessing “reasonable foreseeability” and then 
assess how that standard applies under the facts of this case.  
1. Determining the Appropriate Foreseeability 
Test 
 In Halkias, the Fifth Circuit was presented with a 
defense contractor that was forced to lay off its employees 
after the United States Navy canceled a significant contract 
due to the contractor’s cost overruns.  137 F.3d at 334.  When 
assessing the appropriate test for reasonable foreseeability, 
the court held that anything less than a probability would be 
“impracticable” because cost overruns are a frequent 
occurrence that only rarely result in cancellation, although 
cancellation is a “possibility” each time an overrun occurs.  
Id. at 336.  Thus, the court reasoned, if the mere possibility of 
a layoff were enough to trigger the WARN Act, contractors 
“would be put to the needless task of notifying employees of 
possible contract cancellation and concomitant lay-offs” 
every time such an overrun occurred, even though such a 
layoff was still not likely.  Id. at 336.   
 In the nineteen years since Halkias was decided, every 
Circuit to have considered this probability standard for 
WARN Act notice has adopted it.  See United Steel Workers 
of Am. Local 2660, 683 F.3d at 887 (employer’s knowledge 
that economic downtown would hurt demand for its product 
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did not bar unforeseeable business circumstances exception 
because “[n]othing in the record suggests that the extent of 
the economic downturn and its effects on the steel industry 
were probable any time before [the time notice was given]”); 
Gross, 554 F.3d at 876 (“[W]e do not rely on the mere 
possibility that layoffs will occur, but rather look for their 
probability.”); Roquet, 398 F.3d at 589 (holding that while it 
was “[c]ertainly . . . possib[le]” that accounting firm itself 
rather than its individual officers would be indicted, that 
possibility never rose to the level of “probable” and thus 
unforeseeable business circumstances exception applied); 
Watson, 311 F.3d at 765 (adopting probability standard and 
observing that “WARN was not intended to force financially 
fragile, yet economically viable, employers to provide 
WARN notice . . . when there is a possibility that the business 
may fail at some undetermined time in the future.”).10  
 Our Circuit has never directly spoken on this 
probability standard, but our adoption of it is supported by the 
discussion and analysis in our only precedential opinion to 
date addressing the unforeseeable business circumstances 
exception to the WARN Act.  In Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees International Union Local 54 v. 
Elsinore Shore Associates, 173 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999), we 
held that a casino’s closure was not reasonably foreseeable 
and that the unforeseeable business circumstances defense 
                                                 
 10  Multiple district and bankruptcy courts have also 
adopted the Halkias probability standard.  See, e.g., In re 
Jevic Holding Corp., 496 B.R. 151, 160-61 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2013); Law v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., No. 3:05-0836, 
2007 WL 221671, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2007). 
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therefore applied to excuse that casino’s failure to notify its 
employees prior to its being shut down by the New Jersey 
Casino Control Commission.  Id. at 187.  While we did not 
explicitly address whether we found that the closure was not 
“probable,” not “possible,” or something in between, the facts 
that we recounted—including that the Control Commission 
refused to renew the casino’s license due to its financial 
struggles a month prior to the closure and that a Commission-
appointed conservator struggled for an extended time to find a 
buyer for the casino—indicated that we were applying a 
higher standard more akin to a probability test.  Id. at 178.   
 In dicta, moreover, we endorsed the logic of that 
standard, observing that the WARN Act was not intended to 
“require an economically viable employer to provide notice 
of a possible—but unlikely—closing” and that requiring such 
premature notice could have the perverse effects of causing 
creditors to refuse to provide the struggling company with 
further credit or prompting employees to unnecessarily leave 
their jobs—potentially forfeiting valuable future assets such 
as unvested benefits.  Id. at 185 n.7.  And we also noted that 
these unintended consequences not only would not serve the 
purposes of the WARN Act but “would increase the chance 
that an employer will be forced to close and lay off its 
employees, harming precisely those persons WARN attempts 
to protect.”  Id.  
 Here, we have occasion to go a step further than we 
did in Elsinore and to join our Sister Circuits in holding that 
the WARN Act is triggered when a mass layoff becomes 
probable—that is, when the objective facts reflect that the 
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layoff was more likely than not.11  This standard strikes an 
appropriate balance in ensuring employees receive the 
protections the WARN Act was intended to provide without 
imposing an “impracticable” burden on employers that could 
put both them and their employees in harm’s way.12   Halkias, 
137 F.3d at 336.   
                                                 
 11 We emphasize that this probability test will always 
be an objective one, Watson, 311 F.3d at 764, and WARN 
Act liability may not be avoided by an employer clinging to a 
glimmer of hope that it will remain open against improbable 
odds.  Even the most well-intentioned subjective beliefs will 
not excuse failure to comply with the WARN Act’s notice 
requirement if they are not “commercially reasonable” in 
light of the facts that were available to the company in the 
sixty-day period prior to the layoff.  20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(2).  
 12 Of course, “reasonable foreseeability” may have a 
different meaning in different contexts and sometimes has 
been interpreted to mean less than a probability.  See, 
e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 703 (2011) 
(holding that, in the context of the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act, a harm is reasonably foreseeable unless “a 
person has no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular 
condition . . . would or might result in a mishap and injury” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Indian Brand 
Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 
226 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting, in the products liability context, 
than an occurrence is reasonably foreseeable if “in light of the 
general experience within the industry when the product was 
manufactured, [the occurrence] objectively and reasonably 
could have been anticipated” (citation omitted)).  In the 
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Companies in financial distress will frequently be 
forced to make difficult choices on how best to proceed, and 
those decisions will almost always involve the possibility of 
layoffs if they do not pan out exactly as planned.  If 
reasonable foreseeability meant something less than a 
probability, nearly every company in bankruptcy, or even 
considering bankruptcy, would be well advised to send a 
WARN notice, in view of the potential for liquidation of any 
insolvent entity.  And, as we explained in Elsinore, there are 
significant costs and consequences to requiring these 
struggling companies to send notice to their employees 
informing them of every possible “what if” scenario and 
raising the specter that one such scenario is a doomsday.  173 
F.3d at 185 n.7.  When the possibility of a layoff—while 
present—is not the more likely outcome, such premature 
warning has the potential to accelerate a company’s demise 
and necessitate layoffs that otherwise may have been avoided.  
See Roquet, 398 F.3d at 589 (“[T]he WARN Act is not 
intended to deter companies from fighting to stay afloat . . . 
.”); Elsinore, 173 F.3d at 185 n.7.  Thus, we join the many 
courts that have held this is not the burden the WARN Act 
was meant to impose and that a layoff becomes reasonably 
foreseeable only when it becomes more likely than not that it 
will occur.13  
                                                                                                             
WARN Act context, however, that lower standard is not 
appropriate for the reasons we have explained.  
 13 Appellants assert that the Halkias test unfairly 
“transfers the defendant’s burden to the plaintiff” by requiring 
plaintiffs to prove that a layoff was not “probable.”  Reply Br. 
24.  Appellants offer no support for this contention, and we 
reiterate that the burden of proof remains on the employer to 
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2. Application of the Reasonable Foreseeability 
Test   
 Applying this foreseeability analysis to the facts of this 
case, we conclude that Eclipse has met its burden of 
demonstrating that ETIRC’s failure to obtain the financing 
necessary to close the sale was not probable prior to Eclipse’s 
decision to lay off its employees on February 24, 2009.  The 
first relevant date we must consider for WARN Act purposes 
is December 26, 2008, the sixty-day mark at which WARN 
Act notice would have been due.  At that point in time, 
Eclipse was preparing to be sold on a going concern basis via 
auction procedures approved by the Bankruptcy Court, with 
ETIRC serving as a stalking horse bidder.  When no 
additional bidders materialized, the Bankruptcy Court held a 
sale hearing at which it heard multiple days of testimony 
before ultimately approving Eclipse’s sale to ETIRC under 
the terms of the amended asset purchase agreement on 
January 23, 2009.  As it could hardly be said that the failure 
of the sale appeared probable to Eclipse on the very day the 
Bankruptcy Court approved it, Eclipse cannot be held liable 
for its failure to provide WARN Act notice to its employees 
prior to January 23, 2009.14  
                                                                                                             
demonstrate that the layoff in question was not probable at 
the time that WARN Act notice became due.  See Gross, 554 
F.3d at 877 (holding employer “met its summary judgment 
burden of establishing that [the unforeseeable circumstance] . 
. . while always a possibility, was unforeseeable”). 
 14 Although Appellants make much of Eclipse’s CFO’s 
deposition testimony that even prior to the sale’s approval 
Eclipse had “a fair bit of concern over the ability [of ETIRC] 
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 Whether a reasonable jury could find that the exercise 
of commercially reasonable business judgment required 
WARN Act notice to be given at some point in the month 
between the approval of the sale and its ultimate demise is a 
more difficult question.  As Appellants point out, Eclipse’s 
disinterested directors were demanding a more “concrete 
funding commitment” from VEB as early as February 2nd, 
J.A. 998-1000, and were considering converting Eclipse’s 
bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 liquidation on February 4th if such 
a commitment did not materialize.  Although no direct 
“concrete” commitment from VEB ever came, Eclipse’s 
executives and its board received constant assurances from 
Pieper and Bolotin that funding was forthcoming in a matter 
of weeks and, as Eclipse began to run out of money, in a 
matter of days.  While Eclipse’s disinterested directors were 
clearly perturbed by VEB’s delays15 and continued to discuss 
                                                                                                             
to provide financing to close the deal,” the CFO also testified 
that those concerns were resolved by Eclipse’s “removing 
financing as a contingency to closing and requesting to see 
commitment letters from the financers.”  J.A. 904.  While 
VEB’s commitment letters to ETIRC were not as “solid” as 
he would have liked, J.A. 904, he explained, he ultimately felt 
“comfortable enough that [the] money [wa]s going to 
materialize,” J.A. 906, and the Bankruptcy Court clearly 
agreed when it approved the sale on those terms.  This slight 
discomfort with ETIRC’s financing arrangement does not 
create a factual dispute as to whether it was probable that the 
sale was going to fail on or before its final approval in late 
January 2009.  
 
15 We note that while these constant delays were no 
doubt frustrating to Eclipse, they were not entirely 
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the possibility of liquidating the company without more 
definite financial commitments, they ultimately deemed the 
continual oral assurances they received from Pieper and 
Bolotin to be compelling enough to continue on a path 
towards closing.  
 While these assurances may look like empty promises 
in hindsight, we must consider the decisions Eclipse made 
based on the information available to it at the time and “in 
light of the history of the business and of the industry in 
which that business operated,” Elsinore, 173 F.3d at 186.  
This history included Eclipse and ETIRC’s business 
relationship for years prior to the sale, with ETIRC taking on 
an even more active role in Eclipse’s affairs in the months 
leading up to the bankruptcy.  Moreover, Pieper and Bolotin, 
while acting as representatives of ETIRC through much of the 
sale process, were both members of Eclipse’s board of 
directors, with Pieper serving as Eclipse’s CEO.  Thus, by the 
time the companies began to negotiate the sale, ETIRC and its 
representatives had repeatedly expressed their desire to keep 
Eclipse operational, and had proven their willingness to act in 
furtherance of that goal—filling board seats and providing 
financial assistance on multiple occasions to help keep 
Eclipse afloat.  This longstanding relationship bears heavily 
                                                                                                             
unexpected and do not in and of themselves indicate it was 
likely the deal would fail.  As the District Court observed, the 
asset purchase agreement expressly anticipated a prolonged 
closing period by providing a month-long “cushion” for the 
deal to close—until February 28, 2009—before either party 
was given the option to terminate the contract.  In re AE 
Liquidation, Inc., 556 B.R. at 620.  
 
36 
 
on our assessment of Eclipse’s expectations in the face of 
ETIRC’s continual reports that funding was on the way, for 
these were not grandiose promises from a stranger, but 
assurances from a credible business partner with a 
demonstrated commitment to Eclipse’s survival.16  With this 
history in mind, we review the specific assurances Eclipse 
received regarding ETIRC’s funding to assess whether the 
sale’s failure ever crossed the line from possible to probable 
before February 24, 2009.   
 Considering first the assurances Eclipse received prior 
to Prime Minister Putin’s February 21st decision not to act on 
the funding of the sale, we conclude that before that point 
Eclipse had little reason to believe the sale would not close. 
While it was forced to encounter numerous frustrating delays 
as it had with the Russian factory deal previously, Eclipse had 
                                                 
 16 Appellants contend that the history of the parties’ 
business dealings cut in their favor, as the record reflects that 
VEB had been stringing Pieper along with unfulfilled 
promises of funding for the Russian factory deal since 
January 2008.  Thus, Appellants contend that this “checkered 
history” of ETIRC and Eclipse’s business dealings with VEB 
“made the sale’s failure at least reasonably foreseeable, if not 
the likely outcome.”  Appellants’ Br. 40.  Although VEB’s 
prior failure to timely fund the factory deal is relevant to our 
assessment of whether a similarly situated employer would 
have recognized at an earlier date that VEB’s funding was 
unlikely to materialize, it does not by itself create a dispute of 
material fact when considered in light of the history and 
context of Eclipse’s relationship with ETIRC.  See Elsinore, 
173 F.3d at 186.   
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received consistent positive reports from Pieper, who had just 
returned from Moscow where he met with one of the Prime 
Minister’s deputies, Bolotin, and a Russian Governor directly.  
These credible parties reported that VEB had been 
recapitalized, that funds had been allocated to the sale, and 
that the funding would be forthcoming in a matter of days.  
Although it was of course possible the funding could fall 
through, Eclipse had a reliable basis to believe it was more 
likely than not the funding would receive Prime Minister 
Putin’s final approval on February 21st and be dispersed 
shortly thereafter.17  Before February 21st, in other words, it 
appeared probable the sale would close, and no WARN Act 
notice was required. 
 The last three days between February 21st and 24th 
present a closer question, as much of the optimism 
surrounding the sale appeared to have dissipated.  Still, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the sale’s failure became 
probable in that time frame.  Eclipse had received every 
indication that the sale was about to close up until that point, 
and Bolotin’s preliminary report from the February 21st 
meeting—with more information supposedly forthcoming—
indicated only that the Prime Minister simply “still had to 
think about” the sale further after one of his colleagues who 
                                                 
17 In addition to the reasons given above, Eclipse had 
even less reason to believe the sale would not close prior to 
February 17th, when ETIRC disclosed it did not have the  
capital to fund Eclipse without the VEB loan, even on an 
interim basis.  As ETIRC had not made its proposed loan 
from VEB a condition of closing the deal, there was potential 
up until this disclosure that the deal could close even if the 
VEB funding was significantly delayed or did not materialize.  
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was heavily involved with the sale had missed the meeting 
due to a medical emergency.  J.A. 1028.  Although Pieper 
informed the noteholders on the 22nd that it appeared 
problems had arisen with the financing, it was not apparent 
what those problems were, and, on the 23rd both Pieper and 
Bolotin expressed their beliefs that any issues could be 
resolved promptly, with Bolotin promising a definitive 
answer by February 24th.  As soon as the February 24th 
deadline passed with no positive report, Eclipse filed the 
motion to convert, and notified its employees accordingly.  
 Although the chances of the sale falling apart may 
have reached fifty-fifty while the company waited to hear if 
and when Prime Minister Putin planned to next consider 
releasing the already-allocated funds for the closing, Pieper 
and Bolotin continued to reassure the board and the 
noteholders that any issues with the financing could be 
resolved and promised there would be an answer within days.  
Under these circumstances, and taking account of the 
historical relationship between the companies, it was 
commercially reasonable for Eclipse to believe that the sale 
was still at least as likely to close as to fall through before 
February 24th, so that no WARN Act notice was required 
prior to that time.18  See Roquet, 398 F.3d at 589 (holding that 
                                                 
 18 Appellants insist that, at the very least, Eclipse ought 
to have provided its employees with conditional notice under 
20 C.F.R. § 639.7(a)(3).  This regulation however, contains 
only permissive language, providing that “[n]otice may be 
given conditional upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an 
event.”  Id. (emphasis added).  While conditional notice may 
be a useful tool to help employers ensure that they have 
complied with the WARN Act in close cases, such notice is 
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in-person meeting and subsequent ongoing investigation by 
Department of Justice regarding company’s criminal liability 
did not make company’s indictment “probable”); Burnsides v. 
MJ Optical, Inc., 128 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding 
seller was not liable under the WARN Act for “believing the 
sale would go through according to the . . . letter of intent” 
when buyer changed the previously agreed upon terms at the 
last minute).   
IV. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, Eclipse has met its burden 
of demonstrating that its eventual shutdown and layoff of its 
employees was not probable prior to February 24, 2009, and 
it is entitled to invoke the WARN Act’s unforeseeable 
business circumstances exception as a matter of law.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the order and judgment of the 
District Court, and by extension the Bankruptcy Court.  
                                                                                                             
not mandatory, and Eclipse cannot be held liable for its 
failure to provide it.  See Loehrer, 98 F.3d at 1063 n.9.  
